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Abstract: Juries, committees and experts panels commonly appraise things of one kind or another on 
the basis of grades awarded by several people. When everybody’s grading thresholds are known to be 
the same, the results sometimes can be counted on to reflect the graders’ opinion. Otherwise, they 
often cannot. Under certain conditions, Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem entails that judgements 
reached by aggregating grades do not reliably track any collective sense of better and worse at all. 
These claims are made by adapting the Arrow-Sen framework for social choice to study grading in 
groups.     
Keywords: Grading, Context, Social Choice, Arrow’s Theorem 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arts and Humanities Research Council in Britain evaluates research proposals by convening a 
panel. It assigns to each proposal two “introducers,” who award one of six numerical grades. Later the 
panel agrees on a grade for each proposal, and ranks them all from better to worse. This is an example 
of grading in groups. There are many others. Experts on a systematic review panel rate the quality of 
medical evidence as High, Moderate or Low. The Michelin company awards restaurants from no stars 
to three after visits by its inspectors. Editors accept or reject submitted articles after taking advice from 
reviewers. In Tromsø, two teachers separately assign each student’s work a letter grade and then get 
together to decide the final result. The students in turn go online to evaluate their teachers and courses,  
and potential employers will rank them as job candidates on the basis of the grades awarded their 
coursework. Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki (2010) discuss many examples of grading in groups, 
from the evaluation of wine, sports, music and more.  
Often there is no saying precisely how good or bad things are. Relevant information is missing, or 
expertise is lacking, or criteria of evaluation are unclear—and always time is short. We can award 
grades even so. This is because they are coarse grained, each grade covering a range of degrees of 
merit. Again, often we don’t even want precise knowledge, and grades ease communication by 
smoothing over unimportant differences. It helps that they are contextual, their interpretation varying 
somewhat from person to person, and from case to case. Grades are supposed to cover small 
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differences, not amplify them, and with some scope to set the thresholds between grades to the case at 
hand we can hope to ensure that any items that are about equally good will receive the same grade. In 
these ways the coarse grain and contextuality of grades promote timely appraisal and effective 
dissemination of results.  
Grades can be misleading, though, and the same features that make them useful are responsible 
also for this. Say Jack and Jill are up for a job. You are to recommend one or the other, on the basis of 
their results in two tests. It’s late, and you’re still at the office. So, who will it be? Jack has a B on both 
tests; Jill one B and a C. It must seem to you that Jack is to be considered the better of the two—or, 
anyway, that this is the only decision that can be justified, on the basis of their grades. There’s a good 
chance that those who graded the tests wouldn’t agree, though. Grades are coarse grained. If on the 
one test Jill got a “high” C and Jack a “low” B then the difference between them there might be very 
small.  If her B was also high, and his other B also low, then the graders might well think that she is 
the better of the two. Or they might come to think so, anyway, if ever they got together to compare 
notes.  
High C’s and low B’s are much of a muchness. What if grades are further apart? It is natural to call 
Jack an overall B, since that is what he got on both tests. Suppose that, instead of the one C, Jill had a 
D. It is tempting then to “split the difference” between her B and D, calling it on balance a C, and so to 
conclude once again that Jack must be considered better than her. But this too would be wrong.  
Grades are contextual. Thresholds vary from case to case, and one test might well have been graded 
more leniently than the other. Say the tests were scored first on a scale from 0 to 100%, and letter 
grades awarded later on the basis of that. Mr. Easy rewarded scores as low as 60% with a B. Ms. 
Measly required for a B at least 85%, and up to 65% could result in a D from her—low B territory, for 
him. Such large differences in the interpretation of grades are not unusual.
1
 It might have been so, for 
all you could know. And, if it was so, then it is quite possible that, in the minds of the graders, Jill is 
the better of the two. It is compatible with the awarded grades that she has a 64% (that was the D, 
from Measly) and an 89% (B, from Easy), to Jack’s 63% (B, from Easy) and 88% (B, from Measly). 
Jill’s underlying scores in this case are higher although her grades are worse. Easy and Measly would 
count her better, after comparing notes. And you, with only the grades to go by, would never know.  
The point of course is that while such possibilities as these have not been excluded, any impression 
that Jack must be considered better than Jill is an illusion. It is an artifact of the coarseness and 
contextual shiftiness of grades. Certainly he might be considered better. But he also might not and the 
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 M. Granger Morgan (2014: 7177, Figs. 1 and 2) discusses some empirical studies documenting large 
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grades by themselves cannot settle the matter.
2
 Meanwhile, it is only getting later. Now you really 
must choose! Jack is the only one you can justify recommending, given their grades. So, Jack it will 
be. Such dubious judgements must have helped many careers, and held others back. They are in 
several ways wrong.
3
   
Sometimes it is possible to remove all uncertainty about the thresholds between grades by 
stipulating them. The National Rifle Association in the United States assigns politicians grades from A 
to a menacing F according to their support for its positions. In principle it could specify exactly which 
proportions of votes will earn which grades.
4
 But evaluation is not always this single-minded, and the 
possibilities for pinning down thresholds accordingly are limited. When evaluating research proposals, 
relevant criteria are the significance of the proposed research, the reputations of the investigators, and 
the quality of the proposals themselves. With restaurants we care about ingredients, technique, 
ambience, and value-for-money. People differ in the importance they attach to these factors, though, 
and without settling weights or priorities in advance it cannot be completely clear just what it is that 
grades are supposed to measure. There can be no saying precisely how good or bad things must be to 
get one grade or the other.   
Grades get their meanings in part from other evaluative language. The Research Council defines a 
Grade 4 research proposal as: 
 
A very good proposal demonstrating high international standards of scholarship, originality, 
quality and significance.  
 
Three Michelin stars stands for:  
 
Exceptional cuisine where diners eat extremely well, often superbly. Distinctive dishes are 
precisely executed, using superlative ingredients.  
 
Defining grades in natural language surely promotes a common understanding, the more so when 
people share not only a language but also their culture. But it cannot be expected to remove all 
uncertainty about thresholds. Expressions such as ‘very good’, ‘high standards’, ‘superb’ and 
‘extremely well’ are themselves highly contextual. Depending whom you ask, and where and when 
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you ask, ‘distinctive dishes’ and ‘precisely executed’—perhaps even ‘diners eat extremely well’—
could cover anything from dinner with Paul Bocuse all the way down to driving through a 
McDonald’s. Interpretations of grades must float somewhat freely, together with our understanding of 
other evaluative language to which they are bound.  
This is a study of the consequences of uncertainty about grading thresholds. There is a range of 
cases to consider. At one end there is no such uncertainty. It is known exactly where each grader 
draws the lines between grades, and for each grader it is the same. At the other end, nothing is known 
about this. Each grader might have any thresholds at all, independently of the others.  
In the first case, we will see, grading in groups makes good sense. A rule for aggregating grades 
can be, in a technical sense, sound. Intuitively, what this means is that any judgement that one item is 
better than another, reached on the basis of the grades awarded to them, is bound to reflect the graders’ 
underlying estimations of the items’ merit. At the other extreme, we will see, collective grading cannot 
be relied on in the same way. When nothing at all is known about the graders’ thresholds, collective 
grading under certain plausible assumptions is always unsound. No matter which rule we use for 
forming judgements on the basis of awarded grades, and no matter how we reckon the graders’ 
collective sense of the merit of the items, we cannot rule out the sort of illusion that we saw earlier on, 
when Jack was judged to be better than Jill even though, for all anyone knows, the graders themselves 
think her better.  
The first step will be to set up a technical framework within which to study collective grading. 
Section 2 adapts to this purpose the standard Arrow-Sen framework from social choice theory, 
introducing grading rules as procedures for ranking things on the basis of grades awarded by several 
people. Section 3 translates the conditions of Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem to the case in which 
people grade things instead of ranking them. Section 4 introduces soundness as a further constraint on 
grading. An example shows that it is possible to satisfy this new condition as well as the Arrow 
conditions, if everybody’s grading thresholds are known to be the same. Section 5 states the 
unsoundness theorem. It says that with too much uncertainty about thresholds no grading rule can 
satisfy all the Arrow conditions and still be sound. Section 6 discusses in light of these findings a 
proposal of Balinski and Laraki to use grading in political elections.  
 
 
2. THE QUESTION 
 
In every collective grading problem there are some graders, and there are some things for them to 
grade. Just who and what they are depends on the case. They might be members of a committee and 
project proposals. They might be teachers and course papers, or members of a review panel and bodies 
of medical evidence. We will fix some representative grading problem and study that. Let N be a finite 
set of graders, and let X be a set of things. They could be just about anyone and anything but they do 
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have to be some particular ones. Fix also a finite set G, the vocabulary of available grades, with a 
linear ordering > from better to worse.
5
  
 
Example 1. Let G be {A, B, C, D, F}, and let A > B > C > D > F. This is the language of grades that is 
used, with minor modifications, in colleges and universities throughout the world.  
There is also an aggregator, whose job it is to rank all of the items from better to worse on the 
basis of the grades awarded to them. For ease of exposition let the aggregator be—you. Taking on this 
role doesn’t mean that you cannot at the same time be one of the graders. It doesn’t even mean that 
you are a person.  In online course evaluation, the aggregator is an algorithm running on a computer.  
One question straight away is this: Just how will you proceed, once the graders have told you which 
grades they have awarded? That is, how will you assimilate their input into a single evaluation of all 
the items?  To study this question it will help first to make it precise, using ideas from the theory of 
social choice (List 2013). For any individual grader i, let an individual appraisal Gi be a function 
assigning to each item in the set X some grade in G. That is, Gi(x)  G. Think of Gi as a report that this 
one grader i might hand you, saying which grades he has awarded to which items. A grade profile G is 
a list <G1,…,Gn> of individual appraisals, one for each grader i. It is a possible report from all the 
graders. For instance:  
 
Example 1 (continuation). Let X be {a, b, c}, let N be {1, 2}, and let G1(a) = A, G1(b) = C, G1(c) = C, 
G2(a) = C, G2(b) = A, G2(c) = F. <G1, G2> is a grade profile.  
A grade domain D is a set of grade profiles. Intuitively, these are all the reports that, as far as you 
know, the graders might produce. They needn’t be all conceivable ones. Perhaps only some of the 
grades are made available to the graders at first, the others being held in reserve to smooth over 
differences during aggregation if the graders disagree. A grade domain that does not include all 
“logically possible” reports is said to be restricted.  
Example 2. Let X, N and G be as in Example 1. Let D be the set of all grade profiles G such that for 
any i  N and x  X: Gi(x)  {A, C, F}.  
This domain is suitable for analyzing a grading problem in which the two graders are allowed to 
award only an A, a C or an F, with the intermediate grades B and D held in reserve.
6
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6
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-
/B
+
 and B
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+
 
held in reserve. This is of course just a notational variant of Example 2. I’ve avoided it to maintain continuity 
with the other examples.   
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You will use a fixed procedure or rule for aggregating the grades into a ranking of the items. This 
will keep you consistent. Also, you will choose this rule in advance, before you find out just what 
grades everybody happens to turn in. This will keep you straight. You cannot go back and change your 
mind, if some favorite of yours happens not to come out on top. Let a grading rule be a function F that 
maps any given report G, taken from some domain of possibilities, to a binary relation F(G) on X. For 
any given x and y, the intended interpretation of x F(G) y is: were the graders to hand in report G then 
your judgement on that basis, using rule F, would be that x is as good as y, perhaps better. The 
question is now: Which grading rule will you use?  
Here is a rule that will illustrate several points later on.  
 
Example 3. Let N and G be as in the previous examples. For any g  G, let mid{g, g} be g. For any g1 
and g3  G such that some further grade g2 lies, in the sense of  >, in the middle between g1 and g3, let 
mid{g1, g3} be this g2. If on the other hand there is no such g2 then let mid{g1, g3} go  undefined. For 
instance, mid{D, D} = D, mid{A, C} = B and mid{F, A} = C; but mid{B, C} and mid{B, F} are 
undefined. Now, for any suitable domain, we define a grading rule F as follows: for a given profile G 
we let F(G) be that relation R ⊆ X2 such that xRy if mid{G1(x), G2(x)} and mid{G1(y), G2(y)} are both 
defined, and mid{G1(x), G2(x)} > mid{G1(y), G2(y)}.The following point is important for what is to 
come. Let G be any profile in the domain D of Example 2. Then R is a weak ordering of X, both 
transitive and complete.
7
 R inherits its transitivity from the linear ordering > of the grades. 
Completeness follows from the domain restriction. Because the grades that 1 and 2 assign to any given 
x are either identical or sufficiently far apart, mid{G1(x), G2(x)} is always defined.
8
 
 
So far this set up is only a slight extension of the framework that Kenneth Arrow introduced in 
order to study problems of social choice (Arrow 1951). Notice the one important difference. In 
Arrow’s framework there is no grading of social alternatives. Instead people rank these from better to 
worse. This matters because we can say more by grading things than by ranking them. When for 
instance the Michelin company awards one restaurant three stars and the other just two, it says that the 
first restaurant is better than the second. It says more than just this, though, because different grades 
correspond to the same ranking: had the second restaurant instead received just a single star, or no star, 
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 R is transitive if whenever xRy and yRz, also xRz. R is complete if for any x and y, either xRy or yRx.   
8
 My grading rules are closely related to the social grading functions of Balinski and Laraki (2010: 176), which 
assign to each grade profile a collective grade assignment. Plainly, each of their social grading functions 
determines a grading rule, in my sense, just as in Example 3.  I have avoided using their very natural term social 
ranking function for my grading rules to avoid confusion with another kind of ranking function, the merit 
functions of Section 4.1 
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the implicit comparison would have been the same. There is more information in the grades than in the 
corresponding ranking.  
Notice also that, even so, there is a way in which people typically can say less when asked to grade 
things than when they are allowed to rank them as they see fit. Grading vocabularies tend to be small. 
There are just four Michelin categories, for instance, from no stars to three. The Michelin company 
evaluates tens of thousands of restaurants around the world, though, and so there have to be many, 
many ties; it is out of the question to express using Michelin stars, say, a linear ordering of all the 
restaurants, which would mean assigning to each one a unique grade. When grades can capture some 
given ranking they might do so in more ways than one. Typically, though, there are rankings they 
cannot capture at all.  
 
 
3. CHOOSING A GRADING RULE: SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
 
So now you are on the lookout for a good grading rule. Here are some features to consider. All are 
desirable in a range of grading problems. They are closely related to requirements that Arrow (1951) 
imposed on social welfare functions.  
A first feature that a grading rule F might be expected to have is: 
Completeness (C). For each grade report G in the domain of F, F(G) is a complete relation. 
Completeness is good when our purpose in evaluating things is to choose from among them. Say we 
are to rank some candidates for a job. If we can be sure to end up with a complete ordering of the 
different ones then, if somehow we lose the very best candidate, perhaps to another employer, there 
will always be a second-best candidate to fall back on.   
In order to express the next feature it will help to have some notation for the ranking implicit in the 
grades awarded by an individual i. Given an individual appraisal Gi, let Ği, or flat Gi, be the binary 
relation on X such that x Ği y if Gi(x) > Gi(y).
9
 We can also flatten whole profiles: Ğ = <Ği> is the list 
of everybody’s implicit rankings. Now, let S be some subset of X, and let <Ği>|S be <Ği|S>, the result 
of restricting each ranking in the list to S. The relevant feature is now: 
Ordinally Unrestricted Domain with respect to S (OU-S). For each list <Ri> of |N| weak orderings 
of S, the domain of F includes some report G such that Ğ|S = <Ri>.  
OU-S requires the grading rule to handle a certain variety among inputs. The graders N might put the 
items S in any order, and they might do so independently of one another; the rule has to be able to 
cope no matter what rankings the graders produce. This is a plausible requirement in some grading 
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 8 
 
problems. When evaluating research proposals, for instance, little might be known in advance about 
the merit of the different ones. Then, perhaps, the graders’ appraisals could turn out to be anything, 
and the grading rule had better be ready for everything. Notice that it is possible for a grading rule to 
satisfy OU-S only if there are as many grades in the vocabulary G as there are items in S. With “pass-
fail” grading for instance there are just two grades. All implicit rankings Ği are dichotomous and 
imposing OU-S makes sense only for pairs S.
10
 
Writing R instead of F(G), when the context makes clear which grading rule F and profile G are 
meant, let P be the strict component of R: xPy means that, on the basis of the grades reported in G, x is 
counted really better than y—not merely as good.11 A further condition is then: 
Weak Pareto (WP). For any x, y  X and any G in the domain of F, if, for each i  N, Gi(x)  > Gi(y), 
then xPy.  
This says that when everybody awards one thing a higher grade than another, it must be counted 
strictly better.  
Another feature that might be desirable, for any given set S of items, is:    
Non-Dictatorship with respect to S (D-S). There is no δ  N such that for any x, y  S and any G in 
the domain of F, if Gδ(x) > Gδ(y) then xPy.  
D-S rules out choosing some particular grader in advance and, when the grade report comes in, 
whichever it may be, just reading off the resultant ranking from the grades that this one “dictator” has 
awarded. Indeed, that would seem to defeat a main purpose of grading in a group, which is to pool 
information. Depending on the domain, though, D-S also excludes some perfectly democratic ways of 
proceeding. A “dictator” here is just someone whose grades invariably agree with the judgements of 
the group. That doesn’t entail any power or influence over these.12 
Finally, writing R for F(G) and R
*
 for F(G
*
), we have:  
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I). For any x, y  X, and any G and G* in the domain of F, 
if G|{x, y} = G
*
|{x, y}, then R|{x, y} = R
*
|{x, y}. 
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 The expressive limitations of pass-fail grading might open up possibilities for grading in groups, as do 
dichotomous preferences in Arrow’s framework.  See Maniquet and Mongin (2015).  
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 Technically, xPy if xRy but not yRx. 
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 Suppose for instance that one of three graders invariably awards a grade in the middle of those awarded by the 
other two. And suppose the domain is suitably restricted to reflect this fact. Then D-S rules out a grading 
function like that of Example 3. The moderate grader “dictates” the ranking of any given set S of items, with this 
restricted domain — even if really he’s just cautiously walking the middle line between the other two!   
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I says that the final ranking of any two given items is fixed by the grades awarded just them. It does 
not depend on any other features of these items that are not reflected in their grades, or on which 
grades are awarded to items outside the pair.  
Condition I is always satisfied when, as in Example 3, each item is first awarded a resultant grade 
on the basis of the grades awarded to it by the different graders, and then the ranking R of all the items 
is read off from their resultant grades. Determining resultant grades “on a curve,” on the other hand, 
with some fixed quota set in advance for each grade, may be expected to lead to violations of I. Be this 
as it may, appraising things separately, each according to the grades awarded just to it, seems quite 
natural. Arguably, it is only proper when merit is something that things have all by themselves, not in 
virtue of how they compare to other things. To this extent I is a reasonable constraint on grading rules. 
Now it is not difficult to see that: 
Example 3 (continuation). As defined on the domain D of Example 2, the grading rule F of Example 
3 satisfies conditions C, OU-X, WP, D-X and I. 
Arrow’s (1951) social welfare functions are rules for assimilating individual preference rankings 
into a single “social” ordering. His “impossibility” theorem says that no social welfare function 
satisfies a short list of conditions (for discussion of these, see (Morreau 2014)). Now C, OU-X, WP, D-
X and I are versions of Arrow’s conditions, adapted to the case in which people grade things instead of 
ranking them; since the grading rule of Example 3 satisfies them all, it seems that grading opens up 
possibilities that are not there in Arrow’s framework.13 Balinski and Laraki see this as one advantage 
of their preferred method of majority judgement which, they say, “overcomes” Arrow’s impossibility 
(Balinski and Laraki 2010: xiii). Critical to the solution, in their view, is that a common language of 
grades enables “absolute” judgements of each item separately (Balinski and Laraki 2010: 185).   
One main point in the following is that Arrow’s impossibility is still there in the background—
common language, absolute judgements and satisfaction of the adapted Arrow conditions 
notwithstanding. It is hiding behind an implicit assumption. Uncertainty about thresholds can destroy 
much of the information in grades. Suppose for instance that you as aggregator have no idea where 
one of the graders draws the line between a B and a C. Then, when you hear that he has awarded Jack 
a B and Jill a C, all you’ve really learned is that he thinks Jack is better than Jill: you have a ranking 
but that is all. The hidden assumption is that enough is known about everybody’s thresholds so that 
grades carry more information than just rankings. When too little is known we might as well be back 
in Arrow’s framework, where individual inputs are limited to rankings right from the start; and then, 
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 Example 3 illustrates the “escape” from Arrow’s impossibility in a very simple kind of problem, with just two 
people and three items for them to grade. The underlying idea of this example can be generalized to the case in 
which there are any finite sets of these.  
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as Section 5 shows, it is not possible to satisfy the adapted Arrow conditions together with a further 
condition of “soundness.” That is how Arrow’s impossibility reappears.  
 
4. SOUND GRADING 
 
We have been developing the following model of grading in groups. First, each grader estimates the 
merit of each item, privately and in more or less precise terms. Second, each grader awards a grade to 
each item, on the basis of his estimation of it. Third, all the grades go to you, the aggregator. Finally, 
using a grading rule, you assimilate the grades into resultant ranking of all the items. It is inherent in 
this model that information about merit takes an indirect path from the graders to you, passing through 
the linguistic medium of grades. Intuitively, your grading rule is sound if, to the best of your 
knowledge, the resultant ranking must always agree with the result that a direct aggregation of the 
underlying estimations would have produced—if only, somehow, you could have access to these.  
The qualification “to the best of your knowledge” is crucial. This is where uncertainty about 
thresholds comes in. Section 4.2 shows how to capture this qualification by quantifying over all 
combinations of individual estimations of merit that, for all you can tell, are compatible with the 
reported grades. These combinations make up what I shall call the “import” of the grade report. 
Section 4.3 defines soundness and gives an example of a sound grading rule. Meanwhile, Section 4.1 
lays a foundation for all this by introducing the dimensions of merit that grades measure.     
 
4.1 DEGREES OF MERIT 
Grades measure the goodness of things, or their quality, or value. Here, the term ‘merit’ will cover 
these. Merit has a finer grain than grades: two things might both deserve the same grade even though 
one of them is better than the other. A merit structure is a pair (M, >), of which M is a non-empty set, 
the degrees of merit. It is ordered by > from better to worse. For example, in education we sometimes 
assign students letter grades on the basis of their percentage scores in a separate test. Then M includes 
the numbers between 0 and 100%. There can be more numerical structure than this minimal 
requirement of a better-worse relation. Sometimes, we can add up degrees of merit, and average them.   
I shall assume that comparative merit is a complete ordering: for any distinct degrees of merit m 
and n, either m > n or n > m. With many evaluation problems this is quite unrealistic. Think of two 
restaurants. If one has a better menu than the other, but not such a nice view, there might be no saying 
which of them is, overall, best. Nor do we seem to think they are equally good, though. A further 
slight improvement in the menu at the first restaurant—there’s an additional special today!—won’t tip 
the balance and make it quite simply the better of the two, overall. The restaurants do not seem to be 
comparable in terms of the standard value relations “strictly better” and “equally good”.  
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So, which will it be for lunch? When alternatives are incomparable there might be no uniquely best 
one, nor even a tie for best, and therefore no scope either for maximizing choice. But there is a way in 
which two alternatives, though not comparable by the standard value relations, might still be roughly 
equal. Say we count both restaurants as excellent. They are to this extent comparable with one another. 
If in addition they are better than all the other alternatives then it would seem quite appropriate just to 
flip a mental coin and get on with lunch, as we might with options that really are tied for best. This 
idea recalls Ruth Chang’s (2002) notion of “parity” and the role she sees for it in supporting rational 
choice. Indeed, Chrisoula Andreou’s (2015) account of parity relies on categorical judgements that are 
very much like my grade assignments. Thus the theory of grading, when comparative overall merit is 
an incomplete relation, might underwrite maximizing choice in some cases where it has seemed there 
can be none.   
Balinski and Laraki distinguish grades, messages about merit, from what they call the graders’ 
“deep preferences or utilities.” These utilities, they explain, in the context of voting, are “relative 
measures of satisfaction.” They illustrate this point with the example of the 2002 French presidential 
elections:  
The voters of the left would have hated to see Jacques Chirac defeat Lionel Jospin: their utilities 
for a Chirac victory would have been the lowest possible. The same voters were delighted to see 
Chirac roundly defeat Le Pen in the second round: their utilities for a Chirac victory were the 
highest possible. On the other hand, these same voters would probably have given Chirac a 
grade of Acceptable or Poor […] were he standing against Jospin, Le Pen, or anybody else. 
(Balinski and Laraki 2010: 185)  
Now, in my account, a voter’s estimation of Chirac’s merit is what underlies the appraisal of him as an 
Acceptable candidate, or a Poor one, as the case may be. This estimation is likely to have been the 
same, more or less, irrespective of who the other candidates were. My degrees of merit, then, are not 
relative measures. 
I shall now again borrow the Arrow-Sen framework by introducing merit profiles. A first notion is 
that of an individual merit assignment Mi. This is a function mapping each x to some degree Mi(x) of 
merit. Intuitively, Mi is a possible fact about i’s private estimation of each item, on the basis of which i 
will award grades to the different ones. A merit profile M is a list <M1,…,Mn> of individual merit 
assignments, one for each grader. Notice that merit profiles are not reports. They are not linguistic 
items, or any other sort of thing that can in any direct way be made public. Rather, a merit profile is a 
possible fact about how good or bad all the individual graders might privately take everything to be. 
Merit profiles will figure, here, in an account of the content of grade reports—of the information that 
these convey from the graders to you, the aggregator.  
A merit domain is a set of merit profiles. We will assume that merit domains are unrestricted. That 
is, they include all “logically possible” lists of individual merit assignments. This does not have any 
obvious empirical consequences. It does not constrain the set of items to be evaluated, or how the 
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graders will determine which grades to assign to them, or any other special features of the grading 
problem being studied.  
The unsoundness theorem in Section 5 relies on two assumptions about merit. First, the merit 
ordering is dense. That is, whenever m1 > m3 there is a further degree of merit m2 in between:  m1 > m2 
> m3. Second, it is unbounded above and below: there is no m such that, for each other n, m > n; and 
there is no n such that, for each other m, m > n. These assumptions are used in the proof of the crucial 
Lemma 11. They are strong. Either entails that M is infinite, which limits the applicability of this 
framework. Sometimes, presumably, grades are awarded on the basis of estimations of merit that are 
themselves coarse grained, only less so, and finite in number. Also, these assumptions are 
psychologically unrealistic. I expect that the first can be done away with by requiring instead that, in 
between any two degrees of merit that an individual function Mi actually assigns, there are in M as 
many other degrees of merit as there are grades in the (finite) vocabulary G. The second assumption 
could be replaced by a requirement that no Mi shall assign an extreme value. No grader will ever find 
any of the items under consideration to be so utterly good or so excruciatingly bad that it is not even 
imaginable that something could be better, or worse.  
A merit function FM maps each merit profile M in its domain onto a weak ordering of X. Intuitively, 
it is a procedure for aggregating several estimations of merit into a single collective comparison. One 
equitable way to do so is to average them: 
Example 4. Let X and N be as in the previous examples. Let M be the real interval (0, 1) with the 
obvious ordering. This fixes the merit domain: {<M1, M2>: Mi: X (0, 1)}. Now for any such M = 
<M1, M2> in this domain, and for any x, y  X, let FM(M) be that binary relation R on X such that: 
xRy         if and only if      M1(x) + M2(x) / 2  >   M1(y) + M2(y) / 2. 
The earlier grading rules have the same co-domain as merit functions, all rankings of the set X, but 
they take grade profiles as input, not merit profiles. For clarity, let us from now on use a superscript 
when referring to grading rules as well: FG will be a grading rule, and FM a merit function.   
 
4.2 IMPORT  
We will now need an account of the information carried by grade reports. The basic notion is that of 
an interpretation. It fixes grading thresholds. That is, it tells us precisely how good or bad things have 
to be in order to get one grade or another. This idea is familiar from the grading keys or scales used to 
turn numerical scores into letter grades. Let us refer to the vocabulary G of grades more formally now, 
along with the linear ordering > from better to worse, as a grading language (G, >). Technically, an 
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interpretation maps each grade from G onto an interval of (M, >), the better the grade the higher the 
interval: 
 
Definition 5.  An interpretation of (G, >) in (M, >) is a function I mapping each grade g from G onto a 
subset I(g) of M, such that: 
For each g  G, I(g) is convex: if m1, m3 I(g) and m1 > m2  > m3, then m2  I(g); and 
I is orderly: for any g1, g2 G, m1  I(g1), and m2  I(g2), if g1 > g2 then m1 > m2.   
These are the basic requirements. We can stipulate as well that for each degree of merit there is 
some corresponding grade, and that for each grade there is some degree of merit: 
 gGI(g) = M; and 
For each g  G, I(g) ≠ .  
These further requirements are not as basic but we will impose them as well.
14
 Here is an example of 
an interpretation: 
Example 6.  Let G and M be as in the previous examples. Let I(A) = [0.8, 1.0), I(B) = [0.6, 0.8), I(C) = 
[0.4, 0.6), I(D) = [0.2, 0.4) and I(F) = (0.0, 0.2). Then I is an interpretation of G within M.15   
Say all the graders have finished their work.  They produce a report G saying who has awarded 
which grade to what.  Their report tells you, the aggregator, something about how good they take 
everything to be. Just what it tells you, though, depends on how much you know about their 
thresholds. The information about merit carried by G will now be captured in the notion of the import 
of G, written ⟦G⟧. This is a set of merit profiles. Intuitively, M  ⟦G⟧ means that the information in M 
is, as far as you can tell, compatible with that in G. The less you know about everybody’s thresholds, 
the more compatible merit assignments there are, and the more inclusive is ⟦G⟧.   
First, here is a notion of import for individual graders. 
 
Definition 7. The import ⟦Gi⟧I of Gi, relative to I, is {Mi: for each x  X, Mi(x)  I(Gi(x))} .   
 
⟦Gi⟧I includes Mi if i’s estimation of any given x, according to Mi, is compatible with the grade that i 
has awarded to x, according to Gi, on the assumption that i’s thresholds are I.  
                                                          
14
 Lemma 11 asserts the existence of an interpretation of a certain kind. Much of the work of constructing a 
suitable interpretation, in the appendix, is in making sure that it satisfies these further conditions. 
15
 The intervals corresponding to the different grades do not overlap. This is no accident.  For any distinct g1 and 
g2, either g1 > g2 or g2 > g1. The requirement that I is orderly then tells us that I(g1)  I(g2) = .  
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Now an import function ⟦⟧ maps each profile G in its domain to some set ⟦G⟧ of suitable merit 
profiles.  
 
Example 8. Let X, N, G and M be as in the previous examples, and let I be any interpretation. 
Consider any suitable grade domain D. For any given G  D, let ⟦G⟧, the import of G, be:  
{<M1,M2>: M1  ⟦G1⟧I and M2 ⟦G2⟧I}. 
Intuitively, the import function of Example 8 says which assessments of merit by both graders are 
compatible with any given report G on which grades they have awarded, assuming they have in 
common the grading thresholds I. In some tightly constrained cases this assumption is reasonable.  
The case described before, where grades are awarded on the basis of percentage scores, could be one 
of these—if the graders have settled on a common grading key, and if you as aggregator happen to 
know just which one it is. Let us have a name for import functions of this sort. 
Definition 9. ⟦⟧ is grounded and rafted if there is some I such that for each G in the domain, ⟦G⟧ = 
⨉iN ⟦Gi⟧
I
. 
Grades are less misleading when the aggregator knows this much. Consider again the case of Jack 
and Jill. According to the report G you received, one grader gave Jack a B and the other gave Jill a D:  
G1(Jack) = B and G2(Jill) = D. If ⟦⟧ is grounded and rafted then, irrespective of I, the graders cannot, 
like Mr. Easy and Ms. Measly, have had different thresholds.  ⟦G⟧ doesn’t include any M such that 
MEasy(Jack) = 63% and MMeasly(Jill) = 64%.  There is no common interpretation I such that:  
63% = MEasy(Jack)  I(GEasy(Jack)) = I(B), and also 
64% = MMeasly(Jill)  I(GMeasly(Jill)) = I(D).  
This is because interpretations are orderly (see Definition 5). Since B is a higher grade than D, each 
degree of merit in I(B) must be greater than each degree of merit in I(D), but 63% isn’t greater than 
64%. When import is grounded and rafted, then, the false impression that Jack is better than Jill cannot 
arise, at least not in the same way. Your judgement, based on the grades, might accurately reflect the 
collective judgement of the graders. Example 8 (continuation) describes a case in which it reliably 
does.  
At the other extreme we know nothing about the graders’ thresholds. Letting I  be the set of all 
interpretations,  
Definition 9 (continuation). ⟦⟧ is floating and unrafted if for each G in the domain, 
⟦G⟧ = ⨉iN  ∪I I  ⟦Gi⟧
I
. 
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When ⟦⟧ is floating and unrafted, M  ⟦G⟧ if there are any I1,..., In  such that, for each i, Mi  ⟦Gi⟧
Ii
. 
Intuitively, this is so if there is any way at all, by choosing thresholds for the different graders, to 
square the fine-grained estimations (of M) with the awarded grades (according to G).  
Grade reports don’t tell us very much when import is afloat and unrafted because they don’t rule 
out very much. For instance, to continue with the example of Jack and Jill, we can square the 
offending M with G by allowing the graders to have their own interpretations IEasy and IMeasly
 
such that: 
63%   IEasy(B) and 
64%   IMeasly(D). 
This is precisely how, in Section 1, grades created the false impression that Jack must be better than 
Jill. Section 5 argues that, when import is floating and unrafted, grading in groups is in a sense 
radically unreliable. Under the conditions set out in Section 3, it cannot be counted on to track the 
collective judgement of the graders, no matter how that is reckoned.   
The coming discussion will consider grading in groups at these extremes: the case in which import 
is grounded and rafted, and that in which it is floating and unrafted. There are many other possibilities, 
some of them quite realistic. We might know which interpretation each grader has, but that these are 
not the same for everyone. Then, for each i there is some perhaps distinct interpretation Ii such that 
⟦G⟧ = ⨉iN ⟦Gi⟧Ii.  Again, perhaps we know that the graders have settled on a grading key, but not 
which one it is. Then any grader might interpret the grades in any way at all, but we needn’t reckon 
with the further possibility of different graders having different thresholds: ⟦G⟧ = ∪I I ⨉i N  ⟦Gi⟧I. 
Many other kinds of import functions can be imagined.  
 
4.3 SOUNDNESS   
Finally, here is what it is for a grading rule to be sound. I shall write RG for FG(G), and PG for the strict 
part of RG. Similarly, RM is FM(M), and PM is the strict part of RM. Now we have:  
Definition 10. FG is sound with respect to FM, given ⟦⟧, if for any G  D and any x, y  X: 
 (a) if x RG y then for every M  ⟦G⟧, x RM y; and 
 (b) if x PG y then for every M  ⟦G⟧, x PM y. 
Soundness means that your judgement that one thing is (strictly) better than another, based just on the 
grades, is sure to reflect the graders’ underlying views of the merit of these things—whatever, as far as 
you can tell from the grades, and given what you know about everybody’s thresholds, these views 
might have been.  Remember that when more is known about thresholds, there are fewer possibilities 
in ⟦G⟧. The requirements of Definition 10 are in this case correspondingly mild. Knowing more about 
how everybody interprets the grades therefore makes it easier to find a sound grading rule.   
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Say we are going to choose a grading rule for ranking some research proposals, on the basis of 
grades awarded by two experts. We have discussed the criteria and their relative importance. We have 
considered the judgements of previous panels, and have held a calibration session. As a result we 
know a certain amount about the graders’ thresholds. This knowledge is embodied in an import 
function ⟦⟧. Since it for use under the given circumstances that we need a grading rule, we hold ⟦⟧ 
fixed. Now we can enquire simply whether any given candidate procedure FG is sound with respect to 
any given merit function FM. Let us say we also have a preferred FM. We are going to average 
individual estimates, say, as in Example 4. With both ⟦⟧ and FM held fixed, we can ask simply whether 
FG is sound. 
Why should we care whether it is or not?  Soundness guarantees that there are no false impressions 
like those created by Mr. Easy and Ms. Measly, in Section 1. No matter which grades the experts end 
up reporting, the resultant ranking of the proposals is sure to agree with what they really think of the 
proposals—collectively, and as reckoned by our preferred method. Clause (b) of Definition 10 
concerns the case in which proposal x is ranked strictly higher than proposal y on the basis of their 
grades, while (a) covers the case in which the two proposals are judged to be on a par. Soundness is 
desirable because decisions made using sound procedures can be rationalized. If someone wants to 
know why their proposal wasn’t funded there will be an answer. We can say that these (G) are the 
grades awarded by the experts; that these (⟦G⟧) are the only estimations the experts could possibly 
have of the merit of the proposals, given what we know from the training sessions about their 
understanding of the grades; that the comparison (RM) based on any of these possibilities (M), will 
confirm the resultant ranking (RG) we reckoned by the grades (G) — and that, in this very strong field 
of competitors, the proposal in question sadly could not be counted among the very best. 
To rationalize the decision is not to justify it, because different parts of the rationalization are 
themselves subject to criticism. The disappointed author can still argue that our assumptions about 
grading standards, embodied in ⟦⟧, are incorrect (“the training of the panel members was 
inadequate!”); or that agreement with RM is beside the point because we haven’t used an acceptable 
method FM for reckoning collective comparisons (“one of your so-called ‘experts’ knows almost 
nothing about the specific area of this proposal, and his views should carry less weight!”). Still, the 
rationalization is a beginning. It provides the main structure for a justification and indicates points at 
which it could be shored up or brought down. 
Here is an example of a sound rule: 
 
Example 8 (continuation). More specifically, let D be as in Example 2, and let I be as in Example 6. 
Consider again FG from Example 3. Let the merit function FM be defined as follows. For any suitable 
M and any x, y  X, we put 
xRMy         iff        I -1([M1(x) + M2(x)] / 2) ≥ I
 -1
([M1(y) + M2(y)] / 2) 
 17 
 
This notion of the inverse I-1 of I is natural but not standard: for example, since I(C) = [0.4, 0.6) we 
have I -1(0.5) = C. Intuitively, x RM y means that the graders would collectively award x as high a grade 
as they would y, perhaps a higher one, were they to proceed in the following way: First, the individual 
graders estimate the merit of every item; second, for each one they calculate a collective estimate, by 
averaging their individual estimations of it; finally, using the common grading key—it is implicit in 
I—for each item they look up the grade that it deserves, given their collective estimation of it. 
Now we will see that FG is sound with respect to FM assuming ⟦⟧ (the import function of Example 
8). This follows directly from: 
 
Fact. For any G  D, x, y  X, and M  ⟦G⟧: x RG y if and only if x RM y.  
 
To verify this fact, note first that for any g1, g2   {A, C, F}, and for any m1  I(g1) and m2  I(g2) 
I -1(m1 + m2 / 2) = mid{g1, g2}. 
To see this, check all the possibilities; really, there are only three. Now consider any G  D and any M 
 ⟦G⟧.  By choice of the import function ⟦⟧, for any x, y  X and i  N we have Mi(x)  I(Gi(x)) and 
Mi(y)  I(Gi(y)), so in particular: 
I -1([M1(x) + M2(x)] / 2) = mid{G1(x), G2(x)}, and 
I -1([M1(y) + M2(y)] / 2) = mid{G1(y), G2(y)}. 
Therefore:  
x RG y  ⇔   mid{G1(x), G2(x)} ≥  mid{G1(y), G2(y)} (definition of RG) 
⇔ I -1([M1(x) + M2(x)]/ 2) ≥  I
 -1
([M1(y) + M2(y)] / 2) (above equalities)  
⇔     x RMy (definition of RM).  
This completes the demonstration of the fact and with it the soundness of FG with respect to FM, 
assuming ⟦⟧.   
 
In the discussion surrounding Theorem 14, in the next section, it will be relevant that FM of 
Example 8 (continuation) satisfies Condition I. That is, for any x, y  X, and any M, M* in the domain 
of FM, if M|{x, y} = M
*
|{x, y}, then RM|{x, y} = RM
*
|{x, y}. That it does is obvious because, for any 
merit profile M, whether x RM y just depends on M1(x), M1(y), M2(x) and M2(y), the degrees of merit 
that the different people attribute to x and y.   
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Example 8 (continuation) illustrates soundness in a case where a lot is known about grading 
thresholds. The next section shows how the possibilities for sound grading can turn on how much is 
known.  
 
5. WHEN THERE CAN ONLY BE FALSE IMPRESSIONS 
 
Uncertainty about thresholds seriously undermines grading in groups. It does this by destroying some 
of the information in grades. In extreme cases, we will see, there is only comparative information left. 
People then might as well forget the finer distinctions that can be made by awarding grades and just 
rank things from better to worse; to you, the aggregator, it will be the same. And then, as we will see, 
under certain conditions, no grading rule is sound.
16
  
Recall that Ği is the ordering of X implicit in an individual appraisal Gi. Ği|S is the ordering of S ⊆ 
X. The following lemma plays a crucial part in the coming discussion of the destruction of 
information:  
 
Lemma 11. Let S ⊆ X be finite, let Gi and Hi be individual appraisals such that Ği|S = Ȟi|S, let J be an 
interpretation of the grading language, and let Ni  ⟦Hi⟧
J
. There are I and Mi  ⟦Gi⟧
I
 such that Mi|S = 
Ni|S. 
There is a proof of Lemma 11 in the Appendix.17 It relies on two earlier assumptions about the merit 
structure (M, >): that > is dense, and that there is in M no greatest degree of merit, and no least degree. 
In intuitive terms, suppose an underlying estimation of the merit of things is compatible with the 
grades that someone has awarded. Then, the lemma tells us, by assuming (in general) different 
thresholds, this same underlying estimation can be made compatible with any other grades that this 
grader might have awarded instead, if only everything is in the same order. More slowly: say for 
                                                          
16
 These observations apply as far as I know only to the case in which the set X is finite. This does not seem to 
limit their application very much. Whether it is project proposals we are evaluating, or lecture courses, students, 
politicians, restaurants, bodies of medical evidence or what have you, they usually are finite in number. 
17
 That S is finite is critical. Otherwise, for a schematic counterexample, let S = X = ℕ. Let G be {A, B} and let M  
be ℝ (with obvious orderings). Let Gi(n) = B, for each n  ℕ, and Hi(n) = A. Then Ği|S = Ȟi|S. Now choose J 
such that J(A) = [0, ) and J(B) = (-, 0). Plainly, J is an interpretation of G in ℝ. Let Ni(n) = n, for each n  ℕ.  
Then since Ni(n)  [0, ) = J(A) = J(Hi(n)), we have Ni  ⟦Hi⟧
J
. The conditions of Lemma 11 therefore are met, 
except for the requirement that S is finite. Now, suppose for the contradiction that there are I and Mi such that 
Mi|S = Ni|S and Mi  ⟦Gi⟧
I
. I is an interpretation, so I(A) ≠ . Choose any r  I(A). Now, consider any k  ℕ. We 
have: k = Ni(k) = Mi(k)  I(Gi(k)) = I(B). Since I is orderly, r > k. This argument is good for any k, so we have 
shown that there is some real number that is greater than every natural number.   
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simplicity’s sake that S is the whole set of items,  X. Then the restrictions ‘|S’ can be ignored, and Mi|S 
= Ni|S means that Mi = Ni.  Now, suppose the same ranking is implicit in appraisals Gi and Hi. That is, 
suppose Ği = Ȟi. And suppose furthermore that some estimation Ni can be squared with either one of 
them, let it be Hi, by choosing thresholds for the different grades (there is an interpretation J of all the 
grades such that Ni  ⟦Hi⟧
J
). Then this same Ni can also be squared with the other one, Gi, by choosing 
suitable grading thresholds, in general different ones (Ni = Mi  ⟦Gi⟧
I
, for some I). 
Again putting S = X, Lemma 11 has the direct consequence:  
Corollary 12.  Suppose X is finite and Ği  =  Ȟi. Then ∪I I ⟦Gi⟧I  =  ∪I I ⟦Hi⟧I.   
Intuitively, if i’s thresholds could be anything then any two grade reports from him can be squared 
with the same underlying fine grained assessments, if these reports determine the same ranking. 
Now we will see the havoc that uncertainty about thresholds can wreak on collective grading. From 
Definition 9 and Corollary 12 we have:  
Corollary 13. Suppose X is finite and ⟦⟧ is floating and unrafted. If Ğ = Ȟ, then ⟦G⟧ = ⟦H⟧.  
This says that if nothing special is known about the graders’ thresholds, then their grade reports carry 
no more than ordinal information about merit. We are in effect back in Arrow’s framework. The 
graders can be as fastidious as they want about what gets which grade; it will come to nothing because 
all their report will tell us, in the end, is how they rank everything. All information over and above the 
implicit orderings has been dissipated by our uncertainty about what grades mean, in the mouths and 
common language of the graders. Now, this can rob collective grading of all content:  
Theorem 14. Let X be finite, and let S ⊆ X include at least 3 items. Let ⟦⟧ be floating and unrafted. Let 
grading rule FG satisfy Ordinally Unrestricted Domain with respect to S, Completeness, Weak Pareto, 
and Non-Dictatorship with respect to S; and let a merit function FM satisfy Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives. Then FG is not sound with respect to FM, assuming ⟦⟧.  
Theorem 14 is a consequence of Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem (Arrow 1951). The proof in the 
Appendix is a reductio. Given an import function, grading rule and merit function satisfying the 
conditions of Theorem 14, it is possible to construct an Arrow-style domain and a social welfare 
function. In outline, the domain is the set of all lists of weak orderings gotten by “flattening” grade 
profiles from the domain of FG (flattening is discussed in the beginning of Section 3). The social 
welfare function is then “read off” from the import of these grade profiles, using the merit function. 
This is where the soundness assumption comes in. It makes sure that all merit assignments compatible 
with any given grade report “speak with the same voice” about which items are “socially better” than 
which. That import is floating and rafted ensures, through Corollary 13, that a function is obtained in 
this way. It ensures that whenever flattening makes some grade profiles indistinguishable, their 
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import—and hence, by this construction, also the derived social ordering—are the same. The social 
welfare function in question is shown to satisfy all assumptions of Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem, 
on the basis of the corresponding conditions in Theorem 14. Meanwhile, of course, Arrow’s theorem 
tells us precisely that no such function exists.  
Theorem 14 concerns the case of extreme uncertainty: the graders might have any thresholds at all, 
independently of one another. Under its conditions, grading in groups is radically unsound. Earlier, 
Examples 3 and 8 illustrated the possibilities at the other extreme, where all the graders’ thresholds are 
known to be the same. There was an example of a sound rule satisfying all assumptions of Theorem 
14—except of course the one about the import of grades.  Evidently, then, the possibilities for sound 
grading really do turn on what is known about grading thresholds. They turn somewhere in between 
these extremes, where a certain amount known but not enough to pin things down completely. There 
remains a lot to be learned about the possibilities for collective grading in these cases.
18
 Apart from 
any theoretical interest there might be practical consequences. Knowing more about the consequences 
of mismatched grading thresholds we might be able to develop training that will improve the 
judgement of juries, committees and expert panels.  
Notice a family resemblance between Theorem 14 and Sen’s (1970: theorem 8*2) demonstration 
that measuring individual utilities on a cardinal scale is not by itself enough to escape Arrow’s 
theorem. In each case there is something that destroys information beyond mere comparisons from 
better to worse: with Sen, it is interpersonal incomparability of utilities; here, it is uncertainty about 
how people use words. Beneath this similarity there are differences of substance. I don’t know that we 
can make utilities interpersonally comparable, but it is quite common to constrain how people use 
words. Committees and expert panels provide descriptions of grades in natural language, paradigm 
examples, grading protocols and checklists, calibration exercises and so on.  
 
6. GRADING AND VOTING 
 
…the great Augustus himself, in possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he 
could not… appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language 
of his subjects (John Locke 1961 (1690) Vol. 2:  14-15). 
 
                                                          
18
 It does seem that there can be sound grading when people have different thresholds. Suppose one grader’s 
thresholds are a translation of the other’s: his B is the other’s C, his C the other’s D, and so on. The graders’ 
thresholds, though different, are closely related. Under favorable circumstances like those of Examples 3 and 8, I 
expect there will be sound grading rules with somewhat restricted domains.   
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Say voters rank the candidates in some election from better to worse on a ballot. Their rankings will be 
compiled by some method into a collective ranking, and whoever ends up on top has won. Arrow’s 
theorem describes a theoretical limitation: no method for arriving at collective rankings can satisfy a 
short list of desiderata (Arrow 1951). Some have taken this to mean that there cannot be any such 
thing as democracy, conceived as government by a common will of the people, as revealed by voting. 
Supposedly the very idea of that, captured by the desiderata, is incoherent. Others draw the less 
dramatic conclusion that more information is needed in elections than just voters’ rankings of the 
candidates. Now, by grading you can convey more than just a ranking. Also, the extra information 
seems to be enough to solve some of the problems with traditional voting methods, such as Arrow’s 
impossibility. That emerged here in Section 3. Balinski and Laraki (2010) argue, for this reason among 
others, that we should stop using these traditional methods in elections. Voters should grade 
candidates instead of ranking them. This study raises a question about their proposal.  
Grading in groups is familiar from expert panels, committees and so on, where trained people work 
in close contact with one another. Balinski and Laraki provide other examples and in each case, except 
for voting, it is the same. The graders are judges of sports competitions, or dancing, or music, or wine. 
Now, with a lot of shared training and culture we may expect there to be a good common 
understanding of how grades are to be interpreted. Professional meetings will provide opportunities for 
further coordination, if need be. In Section 4.3 we found reason to expect that, under favorable 
circumstances such as these, grading in groups can be a meaningful exercise.   
Voting in political elections typically involves much larger and above all much looser collections 
of people. The example of Jack and Jill showed how easily we can gain false impressions when 
graders might have different thresholds. More extremely, the unsoundness theorem of Section 5 tells 
us that when nothing is known about the graders’ thresholds, results cannot be counted on to reflect 
any collective sense at all of better and worse. In large, culturally and linguistically diverse 
democracies, such as those of India or the United States, people surely don’t have the same 
understanding of expressions such as Excellent, Good and Fair, and there can be few opportunities for 
bringing about further coordination. The question is simply this: How under such conditions can 
grading be a good way to pick winners?  
The problem of unsoundness is in one way more pernicious than the familiar problems with 
traditional voting methods. That pairwise majority voting sometimes delivers up cycles of collective 
preference can be found out by studying it. So can the susceptibility of Borda counting to strategic 
manipulation. These problems are visible, so to speak, “from within.” They emerge from the details of 
the voting methods themselves. A grading rule, though, is sound with respect to some assumptions 
about what people mean by grades and unsound with respect to others. We’d like to know that the rule 
we use is sound with respect to reasonable assumptions of this sort, ideally with respect to the truth of 
the matter, and whether it is obviously depends on more than the internal workings of the procedure 
itself. It depends on which assumptions are reasonable and which are true, and that might be quite hard 
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to find out. There are substantive disagreements about what is good and what fair. There are 
conceptual disagreements about what it is to be good or fair. How to tell the one kind of disagreement 
from the other?  
Balinski and Laraki discuss at some length the idea that there will have to be a common grading 
language, if grading is to be used in political elections. Also, they seem to think that the people will 
need a common understanding of the applicable grades. They list media coverage, campaign materials 
and debates among the factors that, they say, will give the public a “good sense of what the language 
of grades means,” the first time it is used (Balinski and Laraki 2010: 174, 251). But it is unlikely that 
media coverage and the rest will have this effect, if what is needed is that everyone will converge on 
the same grading thresholds. Public communications rely on natural languages, with all their 
vagueness and contextual shiftiness.  
Natural language definitions do contribute to a common understanding on juries and professional 
panels but there they are supplemented by other methods. There is training with paradigm examples; 
there is discussion of difficult cases; there are calibration meetings, checklists and more. In the GRADE 
approach to evaluating medical evidence, for example, there is a protocol for assigning grades. See 
(Balshem et al. 2011: tables 2 and 3). Presumably all these efforts contribute to the capacity of groups 
to estimate merit, but it is unthinkable that there could be any similar training of voters before 
elections. Turnout is often considered too low as things stand, even with no rigorous educational 
requirements attached! Anyway, the whole idea smacks of interference. Who is to tell me that instead 
of ticking the Excellent box next to my favorite candidate, I should mind my words and tick the Good 
box instead? Very much the same problem of linguistic differences arises in public surveys, and the 
possibilities for training respondents are similarly limited there. Political scientists have developed 
methods correcting people’s responses for linguistic variation after these have been recorded, for 
example using anchoring vignettes (King et al. 2004). But there can be no correcting ballots after 
elections. That would be tampering. Now I’ve in fact ticked the Excellent box, who is to count this as 
only a Good? 
This is not to say that grading cannot be a better way to run elections. The point is rather that if it 
turns out to be a reliable way to identify the candidates that are best, in some independently 
understood sense, then this fact is interesting and deserves further study. Juries, committees and expert 
panels are very small compared to electorates. Perhaps when there are more graders it is enough for 
their grading thresholds to be distributed around a central norm, so that differences cancel out. 
Diversity in their thresholds might even turn out to be an advantage if for every hard grader there is 
another who is correspondingly easy. This would be an interesting finding in itself. We might in this 
case expect that, other things being equal, grading will track merit less reliably when practiced in 
smaller, more homogeneous groups. Contrary to what has seemed intuitive, it might sometimes not be 
good for panel members to coordinate their understanding of grades.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
When too little is known about thresholds, grading in groups cannot be counted on to tell us how good 
or bad people take things to be. What can make it more reliable? Several academic disciplines may be 
expected to help answer this question. Philosophers of language and linguists might tell us what it is 
for different people’s understandings of words to agree. Linguistic and psychological studies into 
language learning, categorization and elicitation methods might give us a better idea of how such 
coordination can be brought about in practice, whether in small groups of experts or in large, culturally 
diverse electorates. Realistically, depending on the case, we may expect to succeed only to some 
extent in bringing about a common understanding. Analytical work using techniques from social 
choice theory and political science might tell us how much coordination will be needed. It is this last 
kind of work that has been begun here.   
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 11. If S is the empty set then the requirement that Mi|S = Ni|S is vacuous and the 
lemma asserts no more than the existence of I and Mi such that Mi  ⟦Gi⟧I. So let S be finite and non-
empty. Assuming Ği|S = Ȟi|S and Ni  ⟦Hi⟧
J
, we will construct a function I: G → Pow(M) and a 
function Mi: X → M such that: 
(a) Mi|S = Ni|S 
(b) For each x in the domain of Mi, Mi(x)  I(Gi(x)) 
(c) For each grade g in the domain of I, I(g) is convex: if m1, m3  I(g) and m1 > m2 
>m3, then m2  I(g) 
(d) I is orderly: for any g1 and g2 in the domain of I, and any m1   I(g1) and m2  I(g2), 
if g1 > g2 then m1 > m2, and 
(e) For each g in the domain of I, I(g) ≠ .  
 
Comparing conditions (c)-(e) with Definition 5, such a function I differs from an interpretation of 
(G, >) in (M,  >) only in that (perhaps)  not gGI(g) = M. That is, the intervals that I assigns to grades 
might not together exhaust M. It is not difficult to see that such a function I can be turned into an 
interpretation, though, by expanding the intervals it assigns so that they do come to exhaust M, while 
maintaining satisfaction of (a)-(e). Then in light of (a), and of (b) (which by Definition 7 for any 
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interpretation I and individual merit assignment Mi means that Mi  ⟦Gi⟧I), the proof of Lemma 11 
will be complete.  
The construction is inductive. The sought functions appear at the end of a sequence of pairs I and 
Mi with ever more-inclusive domains. All pairs in this sequence satisfy (a)-(e), and in addition (to get 
the induction going) also: 
(f) The domain of Mi includes each x  X such that, for some g in the domain of I, 
Gi(x) = g; and 
(g) For each g in the domain of I, I(g) includes both an upper bound and a lower 
bound. 
The domains GS and XS of the functions at the beginning of this sequence are, respectively, {g  G: 
for some s  S, Gi(s) = g} and {x  X: for some g  GS, Gi(x) = g}. That is, GS includes just those 
grades that Gi assigns to an element of S, and XS 
 
includes all of S as well as anything else to which Gi 
assigns one of those grades. The base step of the construction provides I: GS → Pow(M) and Mi: XS 
→M  that satisfy (a)-(g). The induction step extends these functions one grade at a time while 
preserving satisfaction of (a)-(g) until, finally, we arrive at an I whose domain includes all of the 
(finite) set G of grades. Since the corresponding Mi satisfies (f), its domain is X (because Gi is a total 
function). Then the construction is complete. 
Base Step: We construct I: GS → Pow(M) and Mi: XS →M  satisfying (a)-(g).  First, note that, since 
S is finite and non-empty, for any g  GS the set {Ni(s): s  S and Gi(s) = g} includes a minimal 
element and a maximal element (which might be the same). We now let I interpret g as the closed 
interval of M that spans these:  
I(g) = [min{Ni(s): s  S and Gi(s) = g}, max{Ni(s): s  S and Gi(s) = g}]. 
Second, for any s  S, let Mi(s) = Ni(s), and for any x  XS\S let Mi(x) be some element of I(Gi(x)). It is 
obvious that conditions (a), (c), (e), (f) and (g) are satisfied. We will verify (b) and (d). 
Condition (b): Consider any x  XS. If x  XS\S, it is immediately obvious from the construction 
that Mi(x)  I(Gi(x)). If on the other hand x  S then we have:  
Mi(x)  =  Ni(x)      [min{Ni(s): s  S and Gi(s) = Gi(x)}, max{Ni(s): s  S and Gi(s) = Gi(x)}]   
=  I(Gi(x)). 
Condition (d): Consider any g1, g2   GS such that g1  >  g2, and consider any m1  I(g1) and m2  
I(g2). By assumption of the lemma Ği|S = Ȟi|S, so there are h1, h2   G such that h1  > h2, while for any s 
 S, Gi(s) = g1 iff Hi(s) = h1, and Gi(s) = g2 iff Hi(s) = h2. 
Now, by choice of I:  
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m1    I(g1) = [min{Ni(s): s  S and Hi(s) = h1}, max{Ni(s): s  S and Hi(s) = h1}].  
It is an assumption of the lemma that Ni   ⟦Hi⟧
J
, from which we can infer that:  
min{Ni(s): s  S and Hi(s) = h1}  J(h1), and 
max{Ni(s): s  S and Hi(s) = h1}  J(h1). 
Because J is an interpretation, J(h1) is convex. So the three claims above entail m1  J(h1). By identical 
reasoning (put ‘2’ instead of ‘1’ throughout), m2  J(h2). Now, since h1  >  h2, and since J is orderly, 
we have, as required, m1  >  m2. This completes the demonstration that I satisfies condition (d), and the 
base step of the construction. 
Induction Step: Let I*: G* → Pow(M) and Mi*: X* → M satisfy (a)-(g), with G* ⊆ G and X* ⊆ X. 
Pick any g  G/G*. We will construct I: G*{g} → Pow(M) and Mi: X*{x  X : Gi(x) = g} → M  that 
also satisfy (a)-(g). There are three cases to consider:  
(i) g is a higher grade than any in G*: for each h  G*, g > h 
(ii) there are in G* two grades immediately greater and lesser than g: there are h1, h3  
G* such that h1 > g > h3 while for no h2  G*, h1 > h2 > g or g > h2 >h3; and  
(iii) g is a lower grade than any in G*: for each h  G*, h > g.  
We proceed as follows in each case: 
Case (i): let h be the highest grade in G*. I* by induction hypothesis satisfies condition (g). Let n  
I*(h) be the upper bound of I*(h) (by the ordering of the degrees of merit). M we have assumed does 
not have an upper bound, so in particular this n is not one. So it is possible to choose from M some m 
> n, and to extend I* and M*i to I and Mi by putting:  
I(g) = [m, m], while for all h  G*, I(g) = I*(h)  
Mi(x) = m, for each x  X such that Gi(x) = g, and Mi(x) = M*i(x) for each x  X*.  
Case (ii): let h1 and h3 be the immediately greater and lesser grades, let m1 be the lower bound of 
I*(h1) and let m3 be the upper bound of I*(h3). Since I* satisfies (d), m1 > m3. This ordering > of the 
degrees of merit is assumed to be dense, so it is possible to choose some degree m that lies between 
these two: m1 > m > m3. Now define I and Mi as in Case (i). 
Case (iii): this is a mirror image of Case (i). 
It remains to be verified that I and Mi satisfy (a)-(g). We will consider only (d), because satisfaction 
of the other conditions is obvious.  Let g1, g2   G*{g} be such that g1  >  g2, and consider any m1  
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I(g1) and m2  I(g2). To be shown is that m1 > m2. If neither g1 nor g2  is the “new” grade g then, since 
by Induction Hypothesis I* satisfies (d), we are already done.  Suppose on the other hand that one of 
g1 and g2 is g. We will consider only the case where it is g1; the other is analogous. In parallel with the 
construction of I, there are three cases to consider; we will consider only Case (i) since the others can 
be handled using similar reasoning. 
Condition (d), Case (i):  Let  g  > g2   G*,  m1  I(g) = [m, m], and m2  I(g2) =  I*(g2).  It is 
sufficient to show that m  > m2. In the construction, h is the highest grade in G*, so either h = g2, or h  > 
g2. n from the construction is the upper bound of I*(h), so either n = m2  or n  > m2 (by induction 
hypothesis I* satisfies (d) and by choice of n also n  I*(h)). By the construction m > n, so either way 
m > m2.  
This completes the induction step and the proof of Lemma 11.  
 
Proof of Theorem 14. We assume for a contradiction that a grading rule is sound with respect to a 
merit function. Together with the assumptions of the theorem, it is then possible to construct a social 
welfare function in the sense of Arrow (1951) that meets all conditions of his “impossibility” theorem. 
This refutes the initial soundness assumption.  
Let X be finite, and let S ⊆ X be such that |S| ≥ 3. Let ⟦⟧ be floating and unrafted. Let FG satisfy the 
conditions Ordinally Unrestricted Domain with respect to S, Completeness, Weak Pareto, and Non-
Dictatorship with respect to S; and let FM satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Finally, for 
the contradiction, assume that FG is sound with respect to FM, assuming ⟦⟧. 
Letting D be the common domain of ⟦⟧ and of FG, first we have: 
Fact 15. For any G  D and M, N  ⟦G⟧, FM(M) = FM(N).  
Proof of Fact 15. Letting M, N  ⟦G⟧, suppose x FM(M) y. To be shown is that x FM(N) y. We have x 
RG y, since otherwise by Completeness of FG, and therefore of RG, we would have y PG x, and so, by 
part (b) of Definition 10, we would not have x
 
FM(M) y. (Recall that, following the convention, y PM x 
by definition means that y
 
FM(M) x but not x
 
FM(M) y.) Now N  ⟦G⟧ so by part (a) of Definition 10, 
since x RG y, also x
 
FM(N) y. By symmetrical reasoning, if x
 
FM(N) y then x
 
FM(M) y. 
Notice that this fact only requires the soundness and completeness properties. The flattening Ğ of a 
grade profile G is a list of weak orderings of X. It is a profile, in the sense of Arrow (1951). Now we 
will construct an Arrow-style social welfare function f, whose domain A  is {Ğ: G  D}. For each 
profile Ğ  A, we choose some M  ⟦G⟧ and put  f(Ğ) = FM(M).  By Fact 15, it doesn’t matter which 
such M we choose. For this definition of  f to succeed it had better be that f(Ğ) =  f(Ȟ) whenever Ğ = 
Ȟ. This is ensured by Corollary 13. It tells us that, because ⟦⟧ is floating and unrafted, in this case ⟦G⟧ 
= ⟦H⟧.  
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We now verify that f satisfies the following conditions: Universal Domain with respect to S (U-S), 
Ordering (O), Weak Pareto (WP), Non-Dictatorship with respect to S (D-S), and Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (I). Subsequent restriction of both f and A to S will yield an Arrovian domain 
and social welfare function satisfying the familiar conditions of Arrow’s theorem (see for example List 
2013).  Of the above conditions, only U-S and D-S might need definitions, for the rest are already 
standard. Their definitions are by this stage unsurprising: we say that f satisfies U-S if for every list 
<Ri> of |N| weak orderings of S, there is some profile Q in the domain of f such that Q|S = <Ri>. We 
say that f satisfies D-S if f has no S-dictator; that is, there is no δ  N such that for any x, y  S and 
profile Q in the domain of f, if xPδy then xPy. A dictator with respect to S is someone whose strict 
preferences among elements of S invariably are strict social preferences, as well. That these conditions 
are satisfied by f, as defined above for the domain A, is now readily verified:  
U-S: Consider any list <Ri> of |N| weak orderings of S. Since by assumption FG satisfies Ordinally 
Unrestricted Domain with respect to S, there is some G  D such that Ğ|S = <Ri>. Now, Ğ A. 
O: f(Ğ) is a weak ordering of X because, by definition of a merit function, FM(M) always is.  
WP: Suppose for each i, xĞiy but not yĞix. Then, for each i, Gi(x) > Gi(y), and since the grading 
rule FG satisfies Weak Pareto we have xPGy. Now consider any M  ⟦G⟧. By soundness of FG 
with respect to FM, we have x
 
PM y. So by choice of f and Fact 15, xPy. 
D-S: Suppose for contradiction that δ is an S-dictator of f. We will see that, contrary to the 
assumption of the theorem, δ is an S-dictator of FG. To this end, take any G  D and x,y  S, 
and suppose that Gδ(x) > Gδ(y). It is sufficient to show that x PG y. We have in this case x Ğδ y 
but not y Ğδ x, and so, since δ is an S-dictator of f, x P y. Choose any M  ⟦G⟧. By Fact 15 and 
choice of f we have x PM y. By soundness therefore x PG y (otherwise, because RG is complete 
we have y RG x and, by part (a) Definition 10, y RM  x, contradicting x PM y).  
I: Show: for any x, y  X and Ğ, Ȟ  A: if Ğ |{x, y} = Ȟ |{x, y}, then f(Ğ) |{x, y} = f(Ȟ) |{x, y}. 
Suppose Ğ|{x, y} = Ȟ|{x, y}. Choose any N  ⟦H⟧. It is sufficient that there is some M  
⟦G⟧ such that M|{x, y} = N|{x, y}, for then, since by assumption FM satisfies Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives, we have, by definition of f and Fact 15:  
f(Ğ) |{x, y}   =   FM(M) |{x, y}   =   FM(N) |{x, y}  =   f(Ȟ) |{x, y}. 
So let N  ⟦H⟧. Consider any i, 1  i  |N|. Since ⟦⟧ is floating and unrafted, there is some 
interpretation Ji such that Ni  ⟦Hi⟧
Ji
. By our initial supposition that Ğ|{x, y} = Ȟ|{x, y}, also 
Ği|{x, y} = Ȟi|{x, y}. Using Lemma 11, choose some Ii  and some Mi   ⟦Gi⟧Ii such that Mi|{x, y} 
=  Ni|{x, y}. Repeating for each i, construct M = <M1,… Mn>. Plainly, M|{x, y} = N|{x, y}. Since 
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⟦⟧ is floating and unrafted, by Definition 9 we have M  ⟦G⟧.  We have now verified that f 
satisfies I.  
We have seen that f of the construction almost satisfies the conditions of Arrow’s theorem, as 
standardly stated, but not quite: two of the above conditions concern the subset S, not all the 
alternatives X. It remains only to read off, by restricting A and f to the set of alternatives S, a social 
welfare function g satisfying the conditions in their standard form. To this end, let the domain be {Ğ|S: 
Ğ  A} and put g(Ğ|S) = (fĞ)|S. It is not difficult to show that g satisfies the relevant conditions. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 14. 
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